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An Avenue for Corruption: Super PACs and the
Common Vendor Loophole
Matt Choi*
ABSTRACT
In their campaign efforts, Super PACs and political candidates often engage
professional media agencies or political consulting firms to aid them in production and
placement of advertisements on media outlets, planning of advertising efforts, and
planning campaign strategy. But an increasing number of Super PACs have taken to hiring
the same media agencies and consulting firms as the candidates they support. Through the
use of a so-called “common vendor,” Super PACs and their supported candidates can
coordinate advertising strategies with each other without triggering the federal limits on
spending and fundraising.
The Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the public must recognize the threat
that the unregulated use of common vendors poses to our electoral democracy. Because
the FEC has adopted regulations that make bringing complaints regarding common
vendors nearly impossible, Super PACs and political candidates continue to evade
accountability. The FEC should therefore reconsider adopting a rule presuming
coordination whenever a Super PAC and a political candidate use a common vendor. By
doing so, the FEC can require candidates and their Super PACs to truly ensure and
document that no coordination takes place by performing due diligence prior to
engagement and documenting their communications with the media agency. In addition, a
more detailed firewall provision can serve to prophylactically stop actual coordination
from taking place. Addressing the common vendor rule alone will not diminish the everincreasing amount of funds poured into political campaigns by wealthy donors, but closing
off this loophole is essential to an overall campaign regime of full disclosure from political
actors.
Keywords: campaign finance, common vendor, election law, Super PAC, federal election
commission
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INTRODUCTION
In the past two years, the public has turned a watchful eye toward a wave of laws
spreading throughout the United States seeking to restrict voters’ access to polls. At the
same time, a decade-old threat to democracy continues to distort U.S. elections:
independent expenditure-only political action committees, more commonly known as
“Super PACs,” to which the ultra-wealthy donate billions of dollars in every election. In
fact, Super PACs spent considerably more on political campaigns in the 2018 and 2020
elections than in any prior year since the Supreme Court started paving the way for Super
PACs in 2010.1 In the recent 2022 midterms, Super PACs spent $1.3 billion, breaking the
record for midterm Super PAC spending.2 Super PAC spending now takes up an increasing
proportion of overall election-related spending and “dwarfs” spending by candidates or
political parties.3
Super PACs can receive donor contributions without any limit on the aggregate or
individual amounts.4 They can also spend unlimited funds in independent advertising for
1

Karl Evers-Hill, Most Expensive Ever: 2020 Election Cost $14.4 Billion, OPENSECRETS (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/02/2020-cycle-cost-14p4-billion-doubling16/?msclkid=cc32c59ec4fc11eca93b7e6cc94b1cf4; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
2
2022 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/super_pacs (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).
3
Miriam Galston, Outing Outside Group Spending and the Crisis of Nonenforcement, 32 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 253, 265 (2021).
4
See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, AO 2010-11: Contributions to an independent expenditure committee (Aug.
2, 2010), https://www.fec.gov/updates/ao-2010-11-contributions-to-an-independent-expenditurecommittee/ [hereinafter AO 2010-11: Contributions].
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political campaigns because, as groups of individuals, they are entitled to spend as much
as they like as a form of free speech.5 The only legal damper on Super PACs’ ability to
raise and spend is that they cannot contribute directly to a political candidate.6 In addition,
they cannot make coordinated expenditures, such as campaign advertisements for a
candidate in collaboration with the candidate their ads support.7 Coordinated expenditures
are considered contributions because they offer as much value to the candidates as cash.8
Yet, in recent years, Super PACs and political candidates have invented various legally
sound methods to coordinate their expenditures while continuing to enjoy the benefits of
unlimited fundraising. In this way, they skirt one of the only checks keeping megadonations from politicians’ coffers.
The use of a so-called “common vendor” is one of the methods Super PACs and
candidates have taken to using to circumvent contribution limits. In this practice, a Super
PAC uses a commercial vendor to develop advertising material to support a political
candidate while the candidate uses the very same vendor to develop his or her own
advertising material. By hiring the same media vendor for their advertising efforts, Super
PACs and their supported candidates can coordinate their advertising strategies without
triggering penalties. Through this common vendor loophole, some Super PACs put out
advertisements precisely timed with the candidate’s advertisements and with striking
similarities in messaging and targeting.9 As a result, political candidates can rely on the
bottomless pockets of Super PACs and their wealthy donors to pump out advertising to
defeat their rivals. Wealthy donors who wish to throw their weight behind their favored
candidates can give to a sympathetic Super PAC without being subject to the limitations
that would attach to a direct donation to the candidate. In fact, nearly half of the money
donated to Super PACs comes from individual wealthy donors, only 100 of whom donated
$1.6 billion, or 48%, of the $3.3 billion total spent by Super PACs in 2020, giving more
than $2 million each.10 Because of the small pool of large donors, political candidates can
easily discover the identities of their supporters and reward them with favorable legislation,
creating a glaring avenue for corruption.
Despite this glaring corruption risk, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the
agency tasked with enforcing election laws, permits the use of common vendors as long as
the vendor employs an adequate firewall to block communications between the Super PAC
and the candidate who hired the vendor.11 The firewall must be “designed and implemented
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976) (holding that a limitation on independent expenditures “place
substantial and direct restrictions on the ability candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected
political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate”); see also Citizens United, 558
U.S. 356–57 (2010).
6
See AO 2010-11: Contributions, supra note 4.
7
52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(7)(C); AO 2010-11: Contributions, supra note 4.
8
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003) (“[E]xpenditures made after a ‘wink or
nod’ often will be ‘as useful to the candidate as cash.’”) (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001)).
9
See Complaint at 13–14, 16–17, Giffords v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 1:19-cv-01192 (D.D.C. Apr. 24,
2019) [hereinafter Giffords Complaint]; Complaint to FEC at 6, Campaign Legal Ctr. & Margaret Christ v.
MeToo Ohio, Renacci for U.S. Senate, & Majority Strategies, (Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Renacci
Complaint].
10
Evers-Hill, supra note 1.
11
11 C.F.R. § 109.21(h) (2010).
5
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to prohibit the flow of information” between the entity paying for a communication and
the candidate identified in the communication. 12 The regulations do not specify how
exactly this is to be achieved. Instead, the FEC allows a vendor to decide how to implement
its firewall “in light of its specific organization, clients, and personnel.”13 Furthermore,
when the Super PAC or political candidate assert that the vendor established and used a
firewall, the FEC will not take action against them unless there is proof of communication
between them that is material to the creation, production, or distribution of
advertisements.14 This requirement is prohibitive of enforcement; furnishing such proof is
nearly impossible, barring direct admission from either the Super PAC, the candidate, or
the media vendor.15 Hard as it is to believe, the media agency need only deny that the Super
PAC and the candidate communicated to each other, and the FEC will consider this enough
to dismiss the complaint.16
As an illustration, in 2018, Senate candidate James Renacci and the Super PAC
MeToo Ohio, which supported his campaign, both paid the consulting firm Majority
Strategies at least $583,000 to create and disseminate advertisements attacking Renacci’s
opponent, Sherrod Brown.17 On October 12, 2018, Renacci’s campaign and MeToo Ohio
both launched ads attacking Brown—focusing on allegations that Brown physically abused
his wife in the 1980s—by displaying copies of Brown and his ex-wife’s divorce records on
air.18 Renacci made Brown’s divorce a “primary campaign talking point” around the same
time in statements to print media, on national television, local radio, and at political
events. 19 In addition, both ads explicitly connected the allegations against Brown with
Brown’s opposition to Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court nominations, and both
referenced the same excerpts from court documents and used similar visuals, such as
highlighted text from court documents.20 This advertisement was probably a significant
effort for the campaign because it was only the Renacci campaign’s second ad in Ohio’s
entire general election and its first in four months. MeToo Ohio and Renacci also began
12

Id.
Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 33190, 33206 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt.
109).
14
Id.
15
See Sarah E. Adams, How Single-Candidate Super PACs Changed the Game and How to Change It
Back: Adopting A Presumption of Coordination and Fixing the FEC's Gridlock, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 851,
866 (2020).
16
See MUR 7542 Disposition (MeToo Ohio), FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7542/ (last visited May 5, 2022); FED. ELECTION
COMM’N, FIRST GENERAL COUNSEL’S REPORT: MUR 7542 (METOO OHIO) 36 (2020),
https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7542/7542_15.pdf [hereinafter REPORT: MUR 7542] (despite not
being provided with specific information about the vendor’s firewall, the FEC found there was no reason to
doubt it worked as the vendor had asserted).
17
Renacci Complaint, supra note 9, at 3–11.
18
Id. at 6; Andrew J. Tobias, In Second General Election Ad, Jim Renacci Attacks Sherrod Brown over His
1986 Divorce, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 11, 2018, 9:21 PM),
https://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2018/10/in_his_first_general_election.html.
19
Andrew J. Tobias, Jim Renacci Doubles Down on Dredging up Sherrod Brown’s 30-Year-Old Divorce,
CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 20, 2018, 8:40 PM),
https://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2018/09/jim_renacci_doubles_down_on_dr.html.
20
Compare Renacci for Senate, Washington’s Worst, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4uQcexM2Ib4, with Me Too Ohio, Turning a Blind Eye, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yxyppoM_MM.
13
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digital versions of these ads on Facebook during the second week of October 2018 at about
the same time.21 Majority Strategies admitted that it provided advertisement services for
both entities but insisted it had “all of the necessary legal firewalls in place.”22 Because the
FEC does not require a media agency’s firewall policies to be public and has not inquired
into Majority Strategies’ policy, there is no way of verifying their statement. Despite the
substantial circumstantial evidence, the FEC declined to proceed with enforcement after
the common vendor simply claimed that it had the requisite firewall in place—without even
elaborating the firewall’s details.23 Operating under this approach, the FEC has not initiated
to enforcement proceedings on a single common vendor claim since 2004.24
To justify its permissive treatment of common vendors, the FEC draws on First
Amendment free speech values. In 1976, the Supreme Court announced in Buckley v. Valeo
that it considers independent expenditures—political campaign spending by groups
without direction by or collaboration with political candidates—to be a form of speech the
First Amendment protects. 25 Therefore, the Constitution permits no restriction on
individual and group spending as long as they take place independently of candidates
running for federal office.26 On the other hand, Buckley permitted Congress to continue to
limit contributions to candidates because they can adequately express the donors’ support
for candidates even when limited, and Congress was justified by its interest in reducing the
risk of candidates rewarding donors to sympathetic groups.27 In 2003, in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court recognized Congress’s authority to limit indirect
contributions, such as when a Super PAC makes campaign advertisements for a candidate
in collaboration with the candidate. 28 The Court considered these equivalent to
contributions because coordination allows the candidate to utilize the Super PAC’s funds
just as well as if they are donated directly. 29 Interpreting these decisions, the FEC
determined that a flat ban on the use of common vendors would restrict some independent
(and therefore protected) speech; it therefore established safe harbors to allow some usage
of common vendors to continue.30
However, the FEC was mistaken. A Super PAC cannot produce an entirely
independent ad when employing a common vendor with the candidate it supports. First,
21

Renacci Complaint, supra note 9, at 6.
Jack Torry & Jessica Wehrman, Jim Renacci Rips Sherrod Brown for Domestic Abuse; Senator’s ExWife Refutes Claim, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Sept. 13, 2018, 1:53 PM),
https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/politics/elections/state/2018/09/14/jim-renacci-rips-sherrodbrown/10545459007/.
23
REPORT: MUR 7542, supra note 16, at 36.
24
Ashley Balcerzak, Candidates and Their Super PACs Sharing Vendors More Than Ever, OPENSECRETS
(Dec. 21, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/12/candidates-super-pacs-sharevendors/.
25
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1976).
26
Id. (holding that a limitation on independent expenditures “place[s] substantial and direct restrictions on
the ability candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression, restrictions that
the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310,
356–57 (2010).
27
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27.
28
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003).
29
Id.
30
Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 33190, 33206 (June 8, 2006) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt.
109).
22
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multi-pronged media communications are now an indispensable, and arguably the most
crucial, part of any successful electoral campaign. A common media vendor knows both
the candidate’s and Super PAC’s campaign messaging and timing to such depth and degree
that mutual employment inherently creates a high risk of coordination. 31 Second,
monitoring communications through common vendors is so difficult that political actors
can collaborate with very little risk of enforcement.32
The FEC and the public must recognize the threat that the unregulated use of
common vendors poses to our electoral democracy. Because the FEC has adopted
regulations that make it nearly impossible to bring complaints regarding common vendors,
Super PACs and political candidates have evaded accountability for violating campaign
finance laws for over a decade since Super PACs’ creation in 2010. Thus, when a Super
PAC and a candidate use common vendors, the FEC should rebuttably presume that the
two entities have coordinated without requiring proof of communication. In addition, the
FEC should update its “firewall” provision with more specific guidelines in order to
prophylactically protect against coordination.
While closing off the common vendor loophole will not by itself eliminate corruption
from our elections, it is an essential step toward a healthy campaign regime. Part I of this
Note describes the creation and rise of Super PACs and the FEC’s regulation and
enforcement of their conduct. Part II highlights some of the most prominent instances of
the use of common vendors, detailing some of the ways that the current regulations allow
flagrant practices to go unenforced. Part III discusses the specific failings of the current
FEC framework that allow such practices to proceed and then reviews the FEC’s rationale
for its current rules. Part IV compares the FEC’s regulations to Congress’s intent in passing
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and analyzes why the regulations fall short
of the statute’s principles and commands. Lastly, Part V proposes adopting a presumption
of coordination whenever political actors and Super PACs supporting them employ
common vendors as a solution to the current failings of the FEC’s regulations.
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND FEC ENFORCEMENT
The Supreme Court shaped the course of campaign finance law over the past 46 years
in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.33 In Buckley, the Supreme Court reviewed provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that limited outside spending in campaigns—
expenditures—or donations to political candidates—contributions.34 Instead of ruling on
the two categories together, the Court adopted a separate First Amendment analysis for
each, finding that Congress can limit contributions but not expenditures.35 Although both
are forms of speech, the Court held that contributions serve as expressions of support for a
candidate, while expenditures are expressions of political ideas akin to engaging in a
political debate. 36 Thus, the Court permitted Congress to limit contributions since an

31

TAYLOR LINCOLN, DUAL AGENTS 5 (2021); see infra subpart IV(B).
Balcerzak, supra note 24.
33
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34
Id. at 12–13.
35
Id. at 22–23, 38–39.
36
Id. at 22.
32
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expression of support does not lose its speech value from being restricted to a lower dollar
amount.37
The Court pointedly rejected the legitimacy of Congress’s asserted interest in
“equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes,” holding that this
concept was “wholly foreign” to the First Amendment. 38 On the other hand, it upheld
Congress’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption—the exchange of money for
legislative votes—and the appearance of corruption. 39 This interest, therefore, was
sufficient to justify a limit on contributions.40 However, the Court held that congressional
limits on expenditures divest individuals of their ability to engage in “vigorous advocacy”
in the national political discourse.41 A limit on expenditures would decrease the “quantity”
of speech that an individual can make, which would impermissibly restrict First
Amendment free speech rights. 42 For the first time, the Supreme Court expounded the
theory that the First Amendment protects the ability of individuals to use money to
“amplify” speech.43
However, the Court recognized that the First Amendment only protects expenditures
made independently of the political candidate. 44 If an individual or group spends in
coordination with a candidate, the spending is no longer independent, since it is then
tantamount to the candidate’s spending and not the kind of free speech the Court sought to
protect. 45 But the Court did not explain exactly what kind of behavior counts as
coordination,46 leaving Congress and campaign actors mystified in the decades ahead.
Over the next 34 years, the Supreme Court operated within the framework set up by
Buckley, slowly articulating the dividing line between independent expenditures and
coordinated expenditures. Then, the Roberts Court picked up the Buckley strain again in
2010, pushing the envelope further in protecting independent expenditures. In Citizens
United, the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge of a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA, also known as the McCain-Feingold Act) that limited the
amount that corporations could spend in independent expenditures.47 The Court affirmed
Buckley’s First Amendment principle protecting independent expenditures and ruled that
this extended to businesses as well as people.48
Up to this point, the law limited the amount that individuals could contribute to
political groups and committees, providing one of the last checks on the overall amount of

37

Id. at 58.
Id. at 48–49.
39
Id. at 25–28.
40
Id. at 28–29.
41
Id. at 47–48.
42
Id. at 39.
43
Id. at 22.
44
Id. at 46–48.
45
Id. at 46–47 (“Yet such controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as contributions rather than
expenditures under the Act. [The] contribution ceilings rather than [the] independent expenditure limitation
prevent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to
disguised contributions.”).
46
See id. at 46–47.
47
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010).
48
Id. at 339–40.
38
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campaign spending. 49 In SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission in 2010,
however, the D.C. Circuit Court interpreted Citizens United to mean “the government has
no anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to an independent expenditure
group”—that is, a group engaged only in independent expenditures.50 The result was the
rise of Super PACs, a new type of political action committee that could receive unlimited
amounts of money as long as it declared that it would engage only in independent
expenditures.51
Using the potentially unlimited funds they can raise from individual, corporate, union,
and other group donors, Super PACs can engage in massive-scale campaigns in support of
or in opposition to political candidates.52 Super PACs can also contribute to other Super
PACs and regular PACs, but not to candidates or campaigns.53
In their campaign efforts, Super PACs often engage professional media agencies or
political consulting firms (vendors) to aid them. 54 These multi-million dollar firms
specialize in political campaign advertising and cater to prominent political actors,
including presidential candidates. 55 These vendors coordinate advertisement production
and placement on media outlets, such as TV, radio stations, or social media platforms, and
advertisement planning, market research, voter polling services, and campaign strategy
planning. Of course, political candidates and their political parties also produce
advertisements and engage the services of media agencies and political consulting firms to
aid them. Most Super PACs and political candidates diligently avoid hiring the same
vendor as their allied entities, but an increasing number have taken to hiring common
vendors.56
Super PACs and political candidates are required to register and file disclosure
reports about their activities to the FEC, including their donors, donations, and
expenditures.57 The FEC can take enforcement actions if any political actor engages in
prohibited activities or exceeds the federal limits on contributions, forcing them to disgorge
or return any contributions given or expenditures made in excess of federal limits.58 The
FEC can act of its own accord or in response to a complaint filed by any individual or
group.59 Once it receives a complaint, the FEC will evaluate the complaint and responses.60
49

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C).
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
51
AO 2010-11: Contributions, supra note 4.
52
Thomas Reuters, Lobbying, PACs, and Campaign Finance: 50 State Handbook § 10:91 (2022 ed.).
53
Id.
54
See, e.g., Lee Fang, How Mitch McConnell is Bending Every Last Campaign Finance Rule, NATION
(Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-mitch-mcconnell-bending-every-lastcampaign-finance-rule/; Michael McAuliff & Paul Blumenthal, Political Consultants from Mysterious Firm
Tread Fine Legal Line ‘Putting the Lie to Reality’, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://bit.ly/3bIBOgQ.
55
See, e.g., What Do Presidents Joe Biden, Barack Obama and Bill Clinton Have in Common? GMMB,
https://www.gmmb.com/case/political-campaigns/ (last visited Sep. 16, 2022).
56
Balcerzak, supra note 24.
57
Filing PAC Reports, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-andcommittees/filing-pac-reports/ (last visited Sep. 16, 2022).
58
Remedying an Excessive Contribution, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/help-candidatesand-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/remedying-excessive-contribution/ (last visited Sep. 16, 2022).
59
Guidebook for Complainants and Respondents on the FEC Enforcement Process, FED. ELECTION
COMM’N 6–9 (May 2012), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/respondent_guide.pdf
[hereinafter Guidebook for Complainants].
60
Id. at 11.
50
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The General Counsel for the FEC then recommends the agency either proceed to formal
investigation or dismiss the complaint.61 In order to proceed to formal investigation, the
commissioners of the FEC must vote to find a “reason to believe”—that is, that there is
enough evidence to find probable cause that a party has committed or is about to commit a
violation.62
The FEC is composed of six commissioners who are appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.63 No more than three commissioners can represent either major
party. 64 A minimum of four votes, representing a majority of the commissioners, is
required to take any action.65 If a proposed action does not muster the four votes it needs
to proceed, it fails, and the FEC dismisses the complaint.66 The FEC has also been plagued
by paralyzing vacancies.67 Party-line stalemates and chronic vacancies have led to frequent
institutional paralysis that has been a consistent problem for the FEC.68
When an individual suspects that a political actor has committed a federal election
law violation, the individual may bring a complaint before the FEC, and must do so before
seeking judicial action. 69 The FEC has 120 days to decide whether to proceed to
investigation or dismiss the claim. 70 If the FEC delays beyond the 120 days, the
complainant may bring a lawsuit against the FEC in a U.S. District Court and ask the court
to order the FEC to take action.71 If the FEC still fails to act in the face of the court’s order
within thirty more days, the original complainant has the right to bring a lawsuit directly
against the allegedly violative party in federal court.72
The development of campaign finance law and the FEC’s structure have led to an
alarming state of affairs. Super PACs can receive and spend unlimited amounts, creating a
massive stream of cash flowing from donors, to Super PACs, to media agencies and
political consulting firms, and ultimately to the airwaves. All of this invites the kind of
coordination the Buckley Court held should be treated as contributions. Yet, even when
impermissible coordination occurs, the FEC rarely acts due to party-line stalemates or
61

Id. at 12.
Id.
63
Leadership and Structure, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/
(last visited May 5, 2022).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Guidebook for Complainants, supra note 59, at 12–13.
67
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
24 (May 1, 2019), https://bit.ly/3CCSpxE [hereinafter House Administration Responses]; Dave Levinthal,
FEC Lays Bare Internal Conflicts and Challenges in Letters to Congress, CTR FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 9,
2019), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/federal-election-commission-congress-fec-conflict/. In 2020, the
FEC had three vacant positions for commissioners, which meant it was impossible for any action to
proceed. Kate Ackley, Senate Panel Approves Nominees to Fill All FEC Vacancies, ROLL CALL:
CAMPAIGNS (Dec. 3, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://rollcall.com/2020/12/03/senate-panel-approves-nomineesto-fill-all-fec-vacancies.
68
Adams, supra note 15, at 880; Trevor Potter, Money, Politics, and the Crippling of the FEC: A
Symposium on the Federal Election Commission’s Arguable Inability to Effectively Regulate Money in
American Elections, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 447, 456–57 (2017); Levinthal, supra note 67.
69
52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1); Perot v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 97 F.3d 553, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
70
52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).
71
Id.
72
52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(B).
62
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structural gridlock. In the gap these circumstances have created, the abuse of common
vendors has grown.
II. MODERN USE OF COMMON VENDORS
Super PACs have dramatically increased their use of common vendors over the past
decade. 73 In the 2012 election cycle, candidates and their Super PACs hired the same
person or company 161 times.74 In 2016, this number jumped to 632.75 From 2018 to 2020,
the amount common vendors received from Super PACs and candidates increased from
$261 million to $1.14 billion, a jump of 454%.76 In these two election cycles, the spending
was highly concentrated, with nearly $1.3 billion going to just ten firms. 77 The sheer
amount of money candidates and Super PACs funnel into political campaigns through
common vendors demonstrates that this problem cannot be ignored.
A. Volume of Money
The common vendor that political candidates and Super PACs most heavily used in
the 2018 and 2020 election cycles was a group of entities composed of Greer, Margolis,
Mitchell, and Burns (GMMB), Waterfront Strategies, and Great American Media, who
collectively received a total of $930 million. 78 GMMB is a prominent consulting firm
described as a “powerhouse Democratic advertising company,”79 having served prominent
clients such as Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.80 Although GMMB claims that
itself, Waterfront Strategies, and Great American Media are “separate companies with a
strict firewall policy between them,” evidence suggests Waterfront Strategies and Great
American Media may be subsidiary units of GMMB. 81 For instance, both Waterfront
Strategies and Great American Media operate out of the same offices as GMMB, and Great
American Media reported its independent expenditures to the FEC under the name “Great
American Media-GMMB.”82 The Huffington Post reported that Waterfront is in fact “an
internal branch of GMMB” run by a GMMB managing partner.83 This fiction of separate
entities that are in fact functionally identical is a common technique vendors use to further
obfuscate the link between the candidate and the Super PAC. Such “alias entities” are
legally distinct from each other but operate virtually as aliases, often sharing the same
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directors, staff, address, facilities, intellectual property, and resources as the media
vendor.84
The three entities associated with GMMB received $391.1 million for their work in
the 2020 presidential general election while acting as a common vendor, including $241.1
million from Joe Biden’s campaign and the Democratic Party and $150 million from six
Super PACs.85
In response to a reporter’s inquiry about GMMB’s alias entities working for both a
House candidate and a Democratic Super PAC active in that candidate’s contest, GMMB
stated, “We’ve put in place strict firewalls, separate financial streams and passwordprotected areas on our computer networks.” 86 It assured Public Citizen, a nonprofit
consumer rights advocacy group, that “relevant staff go through training conducted by legal
counsel to further ensure careful compliance with regulations.”87 Because media vendors
are not required to publicize their firewall policies, these claims cannot be verified.
The second most highly paid common vendor in the past two election cycles was a
group of entities called the “Slaters Lane Entities” due to their shared address at Slaters
Lane in Alexandria, Virginia.88 The Slaters Lane Entities, American Media and Advocacy,
Red Eagle Media, National Media Research Planning and Placement, OnMessage, Inc.,
Starboard Strategic, and First Tuesday: The Ballot Initiative Group, together collected
$106.8 million for their work as common vendors in fourteen races in the 2018 and 2020
election cycles.89 These, too, have been accused of being functionally identical to each
other, sharing common registered agents, partners, and purchasing agents and accepting
industry awards for work done by each other.90 Evidence shows that candidates and the
respective Super PACs supporting them have coordinated through the Slaters Lane
entities—in some instances, flagrantly so.91
For other common vendors, while overt evidence of coordination is lacking, the scale
of their activities alone is staggering. For instance, Democratic consulting firm Bully Pulpit
Interactive collected $76.7 million as a common vendor in four political races. 92 In the
2020 presidential election, Bully Pulpit received $58 million, consisting of $41.5 million
from the Biden presidential campaign and $16.5 million from various Super PACs,
including $10.7 million from Nextgen Climate Action Committee.93 In 2018, Bully Pulpit
received $8.6 million for the race in Missouri, including $3.6 million from Democratic
Senate candidate Claire McCaskill’s campaign committee and $4.4 million from her

84

See LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 11–12, 14–18, 25–26; CLC Complaints Allege Illegal Coordination
Between Super PACs and Two Senate Campaigns, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Dec. 17, 2020),
https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-complaints-allege-illegal-coordination-between-super-pacs-and-twosenate-campaigns.
85
LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 12–13.
86
Fang, supra note 54.
87
LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 12.
88
Id. at 10, 14.
89
Id. at 14.
90
Giffords v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. CV 19-1192 (EGS), 2021 WL 4805478, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,
2021).
91
See infra subpart II(B).
92
LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 13.
93
Id.

109

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

supporting Super PAC, Priorities USA Action.94 Notably, the Managing Director of Bully
Pulpit had served as digital director for McCaskill in her 2012 Senate campaign.
Targeted Victory, a Republican consulting firm, earned $62.8 million as a common
vendor for work in eleven races, including $22.4 million toward the 2020 Georgia Senate
race between Sonny Perdue and Jon Ossoff, in which it received $12.6 million from
Perdue’s campaign and $5.6 million from two Super PACs supporting Perdue.95 Another
collection of alias entities composed of Smart Media Group, Del Ray Media, and Del Cielo
Media received $45.9 million for work in four races as a common vendor from 2018 to
2020.96 They received $9.7 million from Senate candidate Marsha Blackburn and $1.9
million from two Super PACs supporting Blackburn; $5.5 million from Senate candidate
Bill Hagerty and $1.3 million from a Super PAC supporting Hagerty; and $6.4 million
from the National Republican Committee to assist Senate candidate John James and $10.8
million from a Super PAC supporting James.97
As these examples demonstrate, candidates and Super PACs channel massive
volumes of money toward common vendors.
B. Cases with Persuasive Evidence of Coordination
In other cases, overt evidence indicates that a given Super PAC coordinated with a
candidate. One example was the use of common vendors between James Renacci and
MeToo Ohio, described above.98 Additional instances of potential coordination have been
between the Trump Campaign and the National Rifle Association (NRA), between six
Senate candidates and the NRA, and between two Senate candidates and the PACs Ditch
Fund and March On PAC.
1. The Trump Campaign
In 2016, the Trump campaign and the NRA’s political action committee, the NRAPVF, hired two of the Slaters Lane media strategy firms99 to place pro-Trump, anti-Hillary
Clinton advertisements for TV.100 The NRA-PVF purchased a slate of fifty-two ad slots on
an ABC affiliate TV channel in Virginia targeting adults aged 35 to 64, as the Trump
campaign purchased thirty-three ads with complementary messages on the same station,
set to air during the same week, and aimed at precisely the same demographic.101 While
the Trump campaign and the NRA-PVF employed two legally different entities for their
advertisements, at least four staffers who were employees of both entities signed FCC
registration forms and ad purchase forms for both the Trump campaign and the NRAPVF.102 In fact, one officer named Jon Ferrell signed ad purchases for both the Trump
94
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campaign and the NRA-PVF with the same ABC channel.103 This severely undercuts any
arguments that the two political organizations did not coordinate their strategies through
the Slaters Lane group.104 After all, as the Campaign Legal Center, a government watchdog
nonprofit organization, commented, “[i]t is impossible for these consultants to have
established firewalls in their brains.” 105 If this was the case, the NRA-PVF provided
contributions to the Trump campaign in excess of the federal limits. In 2018, Giffords, a
gun control advocacy group, filed administrative complaints with the FEC alleging illegal
coordination between the Trump campaign and the NRA-PVF.106 After the FEC failed to
take any action on the complaints within 120 days as required by law, Giffords filed suit
against the agency in 2019 for its failure to act.107 Yet, even after a district court ordered it
to do so in 2021, the FEC did not act on Giffords’s complaints.108 In November 2021,
Giffords sued the NRA directly in district court, as it is entitled to do after exhausting the
administrative process, and the case remains pending.109
2. Six U.S. Senate Candidates and the NRA
From 2014 to 2018, the NRA and Senate candidates Thom Tillis, Tom Cotton, Cory
Gardner, Ron Johnson, Matt Rosendale, and Josh Hawley mutually paid $96 million to two
of the Slaters Lane entities for political consulting, with one Slaters Lane officer serving
simultaneously as media strategist or consultant for all of the candidates and as the director
of the alias entity that served the NRA.110 At times, the candidates and the NRA placed
campaign ads on the same TV station on the same day with similar messaging through this
common vendor.111 Tellingly, at a 2018 fundraiser on his behalf, Rosendale accurately
described the content and timing of the NRA’s advertisements on his behalf despite the
fact that the ads were not disseminated until weeks later.112 Giffords alleged that the NRA
and the six U.S. Senators illegally coordinated in its 2018 complaints to the FEC described
above.113
3. Amy McGrath, Michael Espy, and PACs Ditch Fund and March On PAC
In another case, two Senate candidates Amy McGrath and Michael Espy and the
PACs that supported their respective campaigns, Ditch Fund and March On PAC,
103

LINCOLN, supra note 31, at 15–16.
Spies, supra note 101101.
105
Id.
106
Giffords Complaint, supra note 9, at 16.
107
Brendan Quinn, Victory! Federal Court Orders FEC to Take Action on NRA Complaint, CAMPAIGN
LEGAL CTR. (Sep. 30, 2021), https://campaignlegal.org/update/victory-federal-court-orders-fec-take-actionnra-complaint.
108
See Caitlin Oprysko & Daniel Lippman, Giffords sues NRA alleging campaign finance violations,
POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2021, 6:10 PM), https://politi.co/3x4cFHc.
109
Orion de Nevers, Representing Giffords, CLC Action Sues NRA, Senate Campaigns, for Illegal
Spending, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Nov. 2, 2021), https://campaignlegal.org/update/representing-giffordsclc-action-sues-nra-senate-campaigns-illegal-spending.
110
Giffords Complaint, supra note 9, at 13–14, 16–17.
111
Id. at 16, 17.
112
Id. at 16.
113
Id. at 13–14, 16–17.
104

111

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2022

contracted with the same vendor to place ads.114 The PACs used the political consulting
firm Targeted Platform Media to place their ads, while the McGrath and Espy campaigns
both used Buying Time, a media strategy firm, to place their ads.115 The two firms were
functionally identical, having a common employee, phone, and fax number.116 The same
employee placed many of the ads for the senate campaigns and strategically placed the
PACs’ ads supporting those same campaigns. 117 The Campaign Legal Center filed
complaints with the FEC in 2020 alleging illegal coordination of over $8 million in
expenditures, but the FEC has yet to announce the resolution of this complaint.118
As this shows, the FEC has been reluctant to act even in cases with a great deal of
circumstantial evidence indicating coordination. By requiring concrete proof of
communication, the FEC has made effective enforcement all but impossible.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT FEC FRAMEWORK
Super PACs and candidates have been largely free to employ common vendors in
their campaign pursuits under the FEC’s current regulations. The FEC has not taken a
single enforcement action on a coordination claim since Citizens United in 2010119 and has
not investigated a common vendor case since 2004.120 Consider, for instance, the abovedescribed allegation of coordination between MeToo Ohio and Renacci for U.S. Senate,
who disseminated ads with striking similarities in themes, tone, and style and with
references to the same excerpted court documents and similar visuals.121 Even without any
details regarding the vendor’s firewall policy, the FEC still presumed the firewall to have
been sufficient based merely on the complaint’s failure to conclusively prove that one of
the two purchasers transmitted material information to the other.122 Indeed, Ann Ravel,
former chair of the FEC, observed that the coordination between the NRA and the Trump
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campaign123 was so “obvious” and “blatant” that it appeared “everyone involved probably
just [thought] there [were not] going to be any consequences.”124 So far, they would have
been right.125 What is it about the FEC’s regulations that allows this practice to go virtually
unchecked? Subpart III(A) examines the FEC’s permissive rules for common vendors, and
subpart III(B) describes the FEC’s offered rationale for its current rules.
A. The Current Loophole
The FEC’s common vendor regulations pose two crucial problems. First, they make
finding an actionable use of common vendors too difficult. Second, the regulations’
broadly permissive definition of a “firewall” fails to articulate concrete requirements to
prevent improper information from passing between a candidate and a Super PAC.
First, the regulations set the bar too high for an actionable use of common vendors.
To begin with, they place the burden on the complainant to establish that a Super PAC and
a political candidate have coordinated through a common vendor. In addition, they require
that the vendor performed services for the Super PAC “within 120 days” of being employed
by a candidate 126 and “use[d] or convey[ed] information . . . material to the creation,
production or distribution of the communication.”127 Both of these threshold requirements
“significantly increase the burden for proving coordination, making violations harder to
prove.”128 In fact, the FEC’s previous dismissals of complaints indicate that, without proof
of the transfer of material information, the FEC will not even inquire whether the vendor
has set up a firewall at all.129 The FEC emphasizes that its firewall provisions do not require
commercial vendors to use firewalls, and that it will not draw a “negative inference” from
the lack of a firewall.130
Further, the FEC’s regulations provide for various “safe harbor” exceptions,
specifying that certain conduct will not violate the common vendor rule.131 One safe harbor
exception is satisfied by the use of a firewall, a system or procedure “designed and
implemented to prohibit the flow of information between employees or consultants
providing services for the person paying for the communication and those employees or
consultants currently or previously providing services to the candidate.” 132 The vendor
must describe the firewall it implements in a written policy “distributed to all relevant
employees, consultants, and clients.”133
A firewall fails to qualify for the safe harbor exception if it allows information about
the candidate’s campaign plans, projects, activities, or needs to pass to the person paying
for the communication, and the information was material to the creation, production, or
123
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distribution of the communication.134 The burden is on the complainant to show the media
agency failed to implement an adequate firewall to prevent material information from
passing through it.135
After receiving a complaint, the Commission engages in a factual investigation of
the firewall policy weighing “the credibility and specificity of any allegation of
coordination against the credibility and specificity of the facts presented in the
response.”136 The FEC recommends that the vendor “provide reliable information (e.g.,
affidavits) about an organization’s firewall, and how and when the firewall policy was
distributed and implemented.”137
In sum, the FEC places the burden of proof on the complainant to show that the Super
PAC or candidate conveyed material information through the common vendor; and, if the
common vendor claims that it employed a firewall, the FEC requires the complainant to
show that material information nevertheless passed through the firewall. Without
cooperation from the allegedly violative parties, it is nearly impossible for any
complainants to furnish this kind of evidence and succeed on their claims.
Second, the FEC fails to articulate specific standards that a vendor must meet to have
an adequate firewall. Beyond the bare requirement that the firewall must prevent material
information from passing through it, the regulations fail to apprise vendors of what specific
policies or systems they must implement to accomplish that goal. In fact, the FEC
intentionally avoided imposing more specific procedural requirements, reasoning that “a
firewall is more effective if established and implemented . . . in light of [the organization’s]
specific organization, clients, and personnel.”138 The D.C. Circuit has upheld the firewall
safe harbor provision despite its lack of specificity, deferring to the FEC’s discretion and
experience from adjudicating a prior common vendor case regarding a PAC called
EMILY’s List.139 However, the agency’s lax regulations pose a serious problem. Since
media vendors are also not required to publicize their firewall policies, the vague firewall
rule fails to give media vendors any incentive to adopt rigorous, competitive measures in
keeping with modern technological standards.
B. The FEC’s Rationale
Scholars observe that the FEC’s common vendor provisions appear “flimsy” even to
“ordinary citizens not trained in the technical legal standards adopted by the FEC.”140 The
FEC’s provisions are laxer than those of many states; for example, California adopts a
presumption of coordination whenever a Super PAC and a candidate employ a common
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vendor.141 Many find that, while the FEC upholds the principle of free speech from Citizens
United, it neglects Congress’s judicially sanctioned interest in preventing quid pro quo
corruption.142 The Harvard Law Review criticized the rules as “permissive” and facilitating
“a greater degree of candidate engagement with Super PAC efforts than may be desirable
considering the mandate of independence imposed on Super PACs.”143 The regulations
betray a highly deferential attitude toward political players, drawing a wide, permissive
berth around their existing practices. Examining the FEC’s stated rationales for drafting
the rules as it did could illuminate the reasons for the rules’ current deficiencies.
Administrative records indicate that, when the FEC passed its regulations on
coordination and common vendors, it was more preoccupied with protecting common
vendor use than it was with preventing potentially corruptive behavior.144 Indeed, as I will
describe below, the FEC manifested a desire to keep from chilling protected speech in
accordance with Buckley and protect Super PACs and candidates from speculative
complaints.145
One of the FEC’s primary objectives in promulgating the coordination and common
vendor regulations was to avoid curtailing or chilling protected speech. 146 During the
public hearing on the rules, the commissioners repeatedly described themselves as “true
believer[s]” of the First Amendment147 and noted that “the Supreme Court has recognized
that political party committees [and other committees] have the right to make unlimited
independent expenditures.”148
In addition, while forming the rules, the FEC was highly focused on protecting
existing “business practices” of political actors at the time.149 In the first proposal of the
regulations, the FEC acknowledged the outcry from political actors concerned with the
impact that a strict ban on common vendors would have on their campaign efforts.150 The
FEC noted the many comments it received from individuals concerned about the “potential
liability that would attach . . . to candidates and party committees” for using the same
vendors as other candidates and party committees, especially due to the often “limited
number of qualified vendors in a given geographic area.”151
141
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During the rulemaking hearings, several FEC commissioners expressed concern
about the risk that a candidate could unknowingly employ a media vendor who had
coincidentally worked for a Super PAC supporting his or her own campaign.152 To prevent
this scenario, they considered adding a knowledge requirement for a violation, though they
did not ultimately do so.153 The commissioners repeatedly returned to the problem posed
by the limited number of vendors available for media and consulting services, observing
that, “if you use a common vendor and there are only two or three out there to do this
extensively,” this precludes a “wide range of organizations from using media buyers in
placing their ads because, if they used any media buyer, there was a high likelihood it
would be one used by a party or the candidate.”154 Essentially, the commissioners were
concerned that, due to the limited number of vendors available, there was a high likelihood
that a Super PAC seeking media services could accidentally hire a vendor also contracting
with a candidate it sought to support.
In addition, the FEC weighed the burden that “speculative complaints” regarding
common vendors would impose on political candidates and parties, as well as the
evidentiary challenge those political actors would face in trying to “prove a negative” by
showing that they had not engaged in discussions through a common vendor.155 In fact, in
the records accompanying the publication of the Final Rules, the FEC made it a point to
assure commenters that the regulations would not establish a presumption of coordination
from the mere use of a common vendor,156 and that they would not “unduly intrud[e] into
existing business practices.”157
In general, the FEC seemed skeptical that the use of common vendors posed any
corruption risk at all. 158 While the commissioners acknowledged that “Congress ha[d]
made a judgment” on the risk of corruption from the use of common vendors in passing
the common vendor provision of the BCRA, they hedged on this judgment, saying
Congress could be “[r]ight or wrong” and that it remained to be seen whether the
justification would “hold up or not” in Court. 159 In addition, while the Commission
recognized the potential for circumvention of their rules by “winks and nods”160 and the
Rulemaking Hearing, supra note 144, at 24 (statement of Vice Chairman Sandstrom) (“Let’s say one of
the organizations . . . decides to produce an ad. They hire someone, unbeknownst to them, who provided
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of knowing contribution. They have to know they are employing a common vendor.”).
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difficulty of proving coordination without the voluntary admission of the involved
parties, 161 they also expressed skepticism about the danger of common vendors. One
commissioner even stated, “I question whether there’s ever really much coordination that
takes place . . . I get the impression the vendors are not really serving as some kind of
conduit for a coordinated campaign strategy.”162
The Commission downplayed and did not respond to testimony during its hearings
about the growing danger of common vendors. A political scientist witness conjectured
that there was “more material-sharing than I think we're all aware of,” stating that, while
she was only aware of a few concrete instances of communication through common
vendors, she was certain there was more occurring without any of their knowledge.163 She
testified that electoral actors had, at the time of her testimony in 2002, already been using
common vendors to avoid charges of coordination “for some time now.”164 Furthermore,
she warned that parties, groups, and candidates would “gravitate” toward using common
vendors in the future, since it was so easy for them to identify and hire vendors who worked
with the candidate or group they wanted to support.165 In addition, she raised an early alarm
about the use of alias entities, remarking that she was “shocked” by the prevalence of media
agencies employing the “fiction” of different firms with identical principal officers, as the
GMMB entities and the Slaters Lane entities have done.166 She warned the FEC that its
common vendor provision ran the risk of “inviting” this behavior.167 The commissioners
responded only with skepticism.168 Of course, electoral actors are doing precisely what the
witness warned the FEC about in 2002.169
However, the FEC had already made up its mind from the beginning and only
solidified its position as the rulemaking went on. The FEC proposed even in its first
proposed version of the rules that parties should not be found liable under the common
vendor standard as long as they followed “prudent business practices” (meaning
maintenance of a firewall policy).170 The FEC did acknowledge the comments it received
during the Notice-and-Comment period of its rulemaking process arguing that “such a safe
harbor [for firewalls] could compromise BCRA” by undermining its purpose.171 Ultimately,
however, the FEC sided with other commenters who urged that the safe harbor was
necessary to reduce the “chilling effect” on organizations conducting lobbying-related
meetings with candidates—that is, to avoid deterring them from exercising their First
Amendment rights to free speech and association.172 The pro-safe harbor commenters also
argued that the safe harbor was necessary to “encourage and enhance compliance with the
161
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coordination regulations” and reduce the burden on organizations to respond to speculative
complaints. 173 The Commission ultimately concluded that “establishing firewalls and
similar screening policies is an effective way to simultaneously protect that right and avoid
improper coordination.”174
The FEC’s skeptical and fleeting consideration of Congress’s interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption is curious. It indicates that, in promulgating these rules, the FEC
underappreciated the constitutional harm and the risk of corruption posed by the use of
common vendors. Instead, the FEC favored allowing candidates, political parties, and
vendors to carry on business as usual.175 The FEC seemed perturbed by the limited pool of
media agencies offering political consulting services. These considerations led the FEC to
conclude that a flat ban on common vendors would be overly restrictive and prohibitive of
normal campaign behavior.
IV. WHY FEC’S REGULATIONS ARE DEFICIENT
Despite the FEC’s apparent rationale for drafting the common vendor rule as it did,
the truth is that the threshold showing and firewall requirements do not conform with the
congressional intent behind BCRA. As a result, the regulations treat as independent
expenditures behavior that should be considered contributions, subverting the expectations
and intent of the original drafters of BCRA.
A. Congressional Intent
The FEC’s regulations run directly counter to Congress’s intent to restrain the kind
of coordinated spending it observed occurring without requiring proof of communication
between the coordinating parties to find violations.176
BCRA amended FECA to define coordinated expenditures as “expenditures made . . .
in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate,
his authorized political committees, or their agents.” 177 This language indicates that
Congress wanted to ensure that the law would only treat as independent those expenditures
lacking any element of cooperation or concerted action.
The Supreme Court strictly protects individuals’ rights to engage in “totally”
independent campaign expenditures.178 This protection, however, relies on the fact that
spending coordinated with political candidates will instead be considered contributions to
the candidates, and therefore subject to regulation.179 In other words, it is only because
contributions are regulated that expenditures can be protected. The Court explained that
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any “prearranged or coordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions”180 are
“as useful to the candidate as cash”181 and could be limited as contributions.182
BCRA’s restriction on contributions is justified by Congress’s interests in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption—the only legitimate governmental interests
the Court has recognized for limiting campaign spending.183 Indeed, courts since Buckley
have consistently identified contributions to candidates as the greatest potential source of
corruption,184 recognizing that these can spawn corruption both directly and indirectly.185
According to the Court, corruption includes not only improper exchanges of money
for votes, but also exchanges of money for undue influence and access to legislators.186 In
Buckley and McConnell, the Court recognized that corruption can arise from making
politicians more “compliant” to the demands of certain interests due to large donations,
giving the donors disproportionate access to the workings of the legislative process.187 The
Court also recognized the interest of preventing the appearance of corruption because of
the discouraging effect it has on voters’ willingness to participate in democratic
governance.188
With the principles of Buckley and McConnell in mind, Congress directed the FEC
to “promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons other
than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and party committees.”189 Congress
specified that “[t]he regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to
establish coordination” and “shall address . . . payments for the use of a common
vendor.”190 As both the the D.C. Circuit Court and the FEC have observed, “BCRA merely
listed several topics the rules ‘shall address,’ providing no guidance as to how the FEC
should address them.”191
Congress’s interest in limiting coordinated expenditures extends to the use of
common vendors. Using common vendors allows a Super PAC and its supported candidate
to act “in cooperation, . . . in concert, with, or at the . . . suggestion of” one another, which
is how BCRA defines coordination.192 Because Super PACs are often run by candidates’
confidants, when they employ common vendors with their candidates, a Super PAC can
180
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spend on advertising that the candidate would have put out anyway, making it little
different from the candidate spending the money him or herself. Thus, the Super PAC’s
spending is as good as “cash” for candidates, transforming the expenditure into a
contribution. 193 Furthermore, since so few major Super PAC donors are out there,
candidates can often easily identify and reward them, 194 meaning donors can “have
confidence that their contributions will carry as much weight as if they were contributing
directly to the candidates’ campaigns.” 195 The reason the Court treats coordinated
expenditures as contributions applies equally for expenditures through common vendors.
Another problem is that, while Congress gave the FEC considerable discretion to
define coordination, it specifically instructed the FEC not to require proof of
communication.196 BCRA directed the FEC to repeal its previous rule, which defined a
communication as “coordinated” only if the producer created, produced, or distributed it
“after substantial discussion” between the spender and the candidate about the
communication, “the result of which is collaboration or agreement.” 197 Senators Russ
Feingold and John McCain, the two originators of the Senate bill, considered the previous
rules to be “far too narrow to be effective in defining coordination in the real world of
campaigns and elections.” 198 They intended that BCRA’s command not to require
“agreement or formal collaboration” would lower the bar, reflecting the reality that “de
facto understandings” and “informal understandings” “can result in actual coordination as
effectively as explicit agreement or formal collaboration.”199
Thus, Congress and the originators of BCRA intended the FEC to pass regulations
that would capture the various forms of coordination in which political actors could engage
in the “real world.”200 They directed the FEC not to require complainants and the FEC (if
acting sua sponte) to prove that an “agreement or formal collaboration” had occurred
between a Super PAC and the supported political candidate.201 Yet, that is just what the
FEC did.
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colo. Republican II), 533 U.S.
431, 446 (2001).
194
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11 C.F.R. § 100.23(c)(2)(iii) (2001) (repealed 2002).
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142 CONG. REC. S2096, S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
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142 CONG. REC. S2096, S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold) (“The FEC’s
narrowly defined standard of requiring collaboration or agreement sets too high a bar to the finding of
‘coordination.’ This standard would miss many cases of coordination that result from de facto
understandings . . . [T]he Commission’s new regulations . . . mean that specific discussions between a
candidate or party and an outside group about campaign-related activity can result in a finding of
coordination, without an ‘agreement or formal collaboration.’”); Id. (statement of Sen. John McCain) (“It is
important for the Commission’s new regulations to ensure that actual ‘coordination’ is captured by the new
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been an agreement or formal collaboration . . . .”).
200
§ 100.23(c)(2)(iii) (2001).
201
Id.
193

120

Vol. 18:1]

Matt Choi
B. Deficiencies of the FEC’s Regulations

Instead of shoring up the deficiencies in the FEC’s pre-BCRA regulations, the FEC’s
new definition of coordination regarding common vendors continues to exhibit a poor fit
with the “real world” behavior of Super PACs and the supported political candidates.202
Activity that appears to invite quid pro quo corruption risk is “either left unaddressed by
the anti-coordination rules currently in place or left unenforced because of the high burden
of proof the regulations require.” 203 As a result, the rules permit “[a]n end-run around
contribution limits,” “open[ing] the door to rapidly increasing opportunities for the reality
or appearance of corruption.”204 The three main deficiencies of the FEC’s regulations are
as follows: (1) the FEC has not given due consideration to the risk of corruption, one of
Congress’s primary motivations in commanding it to form rules for common vendors;
(2) the regulations require proof that material information has passed through the firewall
in order to find a violation, running directly counter to Congress’s command not to require
“agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination”; and (3) the FEC fails to
include sufficient details in its firewall provision that would hold media vendors to a
rigorous standard of behavior that would prophylactically prevent coordination. These
three deficiencies will be discussed further below.
1. Failure to Contemplate the Special Corruption Risk of Common Vendors
First, the FEC has not fully contemplated the special danger posed by the use of
common vendors. In its rulemaking process, at no point did the FEC contemplate the reason
Congress singled out the use of common vendors for regulation. Instead, the FEC devoted
most of its attention to how it could carry out Congress’s command while imposing the
least inconvenience on political actors.205 However, the use of common vendors for any
services relating to campaign strategy in itself poses an extraordinarily high risk of
coordination 206 whose dangers cannot be mitigated by usual “prudent business
practices.”207 As Public Citizen notes, “[p]olitical consulting firms are perfectly positioned
to harmonize the message and strategies of campaigns and super PACs.”208 A client must
share with its media vendor information that necessarily creates a close relationship,
including not only the advertising message, but also key information such as the timing
and target demographic of the message. When a vendor simultaneously works for a
political candidate and a Super PAC supporting that candidate on the very same campaign,
it is highly unlikely that the vendor will be able to produce advertising material without at
least unintentionally utilizing some of the information from the political candidate. Since
202
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many candidates place advertising material and messaging on their websites, Super PACs
can also coordinate with their candidates through publicly known information to produce
ads that are virtually identical to that of the candidates even without specific
communication between the two entities. Thus, some have noted, “there’s always
coordination—the media is the coordination.”209 Because Super PACs only emerged in
2010, the FEC’s 2006 regulations cannot fully contemplate the ease with which candidates
and Super PACs can coordinate today and account for the “the current reality of
coordinated activities.”210
Consequently, the supported candidate gains access to the unlimited pool of funds
drawn from wealthy donors, and major donors can rely on candidates knowing their
identities. The candidate can thus reward them for their disguised donations with “special
favors” of favorable legislative activity211—precisely the type of corruption that Buckley
contemplated. For instance, out of the six Senate candidates the NRA supported through
common vendors, 212 the four candidates who won, Thom Tillis, Cory Gardner, Ron
Johnson, and Tom Cotton, voted against most or all of the major gun control bills that went
to a vote from 2014 to 2018.213
In addition, the regulations lose sight of the limited scope of the “totally
independent[]” expenditures the Supreme Court sought to protect in Buckley, which must
truly be independent in order merit protection. 214 Unlike these totally independent
expenditures, the use of common vendors is in a grey area at best and certainly cannot be
considered truly independent. As the Campaign Legal Center noted, “[s]haring vendors
presents an easy way to undermine the independence of super PACs” because “[t]he
common vendor could operate as a conduit for information between the two.” 215
Furthermore, a Super PAC and the supported candidate employing a common vendor raises
a question of their motive in doing so, given the availability of other vendors. The decision
of a Super PAC and a candidate to hire a common vendor should merit at least an
investigation as to whether the two entities intend to behave “totally independently.”216
Unless the FEC wholly rejects Congress’s interest in preventing corruption, it may
instead attach more value to the practical reality for political actors, who face a limited
range of options for political consulting firms or media vendors who cater to their particular
needs. Indeed, this is what the FEC spent much of the rulemaking process discussing.217
Perhaps the FEC’s reasoning is that it must balance the danger of corruption against the
practical concern of candidates who must choose from a limited pool of vendors. However,
this burden cannot outweigh the danger of corruption from unlimited coordinated
expenditures through a common vendor. To privilege political actors’ convenience over
209
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Congress’s legitimate interest in reducing the risk of corruption218 is to elevate expediency
over constitutional values, something the Supreme Court is unlikely to condone.219
The FEC’s adopted regime, then, may be its attempt to take a measured approach,
premised on the belief that a good firewall fully prevents any danger of corruption.
However, such a reliance on the firewall is misplaced since the FEC’s firewall provision is
far from airtight, as explained further below.
2. Material Information Requirement in Contravention of BCRA’s Instruction
Second, although BCRA instructed the FEC not to “require agreement or formal
collaboration to establish coordination,” 220 its regulations require a near-impossible
showing that “material information” has passed through a firewall in order to find it
deficient.221 As evident from contemporaneous statements by the originators of BCRA,
Congress intended to lower the bar for the treatment of expenditures as coordinated.222 Yet,
the FEC has kept the bar prohibitively high, making it difficult or even impossible for
anyone to bring actionable complaints. As noted above, the Supreme Court has stated that
the “rationale for affording special protection to wholly independent expenditures has . . .
everything to do with the functional consequences of different types of expenditures,”223
not superficial labels. In McConnell, the Court recognized that an individual could easily
act at the request or suggestion of a candidate without any agreement, which would render
the expenditure “virtually indistinguishable from [a] simple contributio[n].”224
The situation BCRA’s originators feared has become reality.225 Due to the material
information requirement, complaints like the one regarding MeToo Ohio and James
Renacci ended up dismissed despite overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to
coordination.226 Neither the law nor the FEC regulations provide any legal tools to allow
parties to compel communication records without voluntary cooperation of the entities
involved in the campaign spending. 227 The FEC can issue subpoenas and orders for
information, but it only does so when it finds “reason to believe” that a violation has
occurred—which it will not do without evidence of shared material information.228 Thus,
third parties have no way to obtain the communication records that would establish the
material information requirement, which they need in order for the FEC to issue the
218
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subpoenas necessary to find the information. It is a loophole in every sense of the word.
Indeed, according to one lobbyist, a candidate’s campaign and its Super PAC “can simply
deny” sharing any information upon being accused.229
The result is that the common vendor rule goes underenforced, just as Congress
anticipated.230 Considering Congress’s specific instruction not to require “agreement or
formal collaboration,” this amounts to an agency failure to honor BCRA’s statutory
command.231
3. Lack of Detailed Description of Firewall
Third, the FEC’s firewall provision lacks sufficient detail to require media vendors
to adopt specific measures and ensure no communication can pass through their firewalls.
Instead, the provision simply commands that the firewall be drafted in such a way as to
“prohibit the flow of information” from passing through. 232 The broad command is
plausible from an outcome-oriented perspective—if no material communication has passed
through the firewall, then the firewall must have served its purposes, whatever method the
agency has chosen to adopt. However, this “no harm, no foul” argument is unconvincing
because, under the FEC’s enforcement structure, a lack of evidence does not indicate a lack
of violation. As described above, complainants and the FEC have no way of ascertaining
whether material information has passed through a firewall without direct admission from
one of the potentially culpable parties. Thus, the vague standard cannot be justified by the
argument that it ensures that no coordination occurs—it simply does not do so.
The vague firewall provision also fails to have any prophylactic or prescriptive
function to allow actors to order their campaign behavior. To begin with, the FEC will not
examine a media vendor’s firewall policies until a complainant or the agency has accused
it of a violation and will not progress to the formal investigation stage unless there is proof
that material information actually passed through. 233 In addition, “firewall policies are
rarely, if ever, shared with the public.”234 The FEC does not require vendors to perform
any documentation or review of its employees’ adherence to its firewall policy or, even
assuming the policy is followed, that it contain sufficient safeguards to prevent
coordination. 235 Therefore, the public has no means to confirm the existence or
effectiveness of these systems, and so the media vendor has no incentive to craft a robust
firewall policy before a complaint is filed—or even afterward.
If a vendor is accused, all it has to do is point to the existence of whatever firewall
policy it has and the lack of proof that material information has passed through, and the
229
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complaint will not likely progress to the investigation stage.236 What is more, as it becomes
more and more obvious that the FEC will not do anything to enforce the law, none of the
media agencies, Super PACs, or candidates have a reason to strengthen their firewall
policies.
In effect, the firewall provision is “permeable, if not largely illusory, at least in the
way that the FEC has chosen to enforce it,”237 and contains imprecise guidelines that the
FEC only enforces if someone furnishes proof that the vendor’s clients have transmitted
material information through the firewall. As they stand, the regulations leave discretion at
the hands of the media agency to segment the pool of data it has readily accessible, leaving
the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. As a result, political actors are disincentivized
from adopting rigorous policies that would guarantee that material information could not
be transmitted despite ample opportunity.
These crucial flaws in the FEC’s regulations prevent the FEC from fully honoring
Congress’s interest in curtailing corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming
from coordinated expenditures through common vendors.
V. PROPOSAL: A PRESUMPTION REGIME
In order to more faithfully carry out the principles and express commands of BCRA,
the FEC should establish a bright-line rule presuming coordination whenever a Super PAC
and a political candidate use a common vendor. Under this standard, if a complaint
provides evidence that a Super PAC has hired a commercial vendor to produce advertising
material within 120 days of that vendor being hired by a political candidate that the material
references, the FEC should begin investigation and enforcement proceedings against the
Super PAC or the candidate, unless they can furnish concrete evidence that they did not
communicate through the common vendor. The existence of a firewall could rebut the
presumption, but the burden would be on the parties accused to show that the firewall was
sufficiently robust to prevent communication from being transmitted between the Super
PAC and the candidate. To provide the standards for evaluation, the FEC should include a
detailed description of the elements a firewall must have to rebut this presumption,
including safeguards to ensure no communication could be transmitted through it. This
should lead to increased enforcement of actual coordination taking place while causing
only minimal burdens on Super PACs’ ability to engage in legitimate campaign activities.
A. A Rebuttable Presumption of Coordination
The FEC should presume coordination whenever a Super PAC and a political
candidate use a common vendor. Adopting such a presumption would lead to increased
enforcement of coordination cases that may be unregulated. For instance, in a case like the
236
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Renacci campaign, in which the allegations did not progress to investigation “because the
common vendor could simply point to a firewall,” a presumption of coordination “would
ultimately force candidates and their Super PACs to truly ensure—and document—that no
coordination had in fact taken place.”238
The proposed rebuttable presumption regime is not novel. Indeed, several states, such
as California, already restrict the use of common vendors. California places the burden of
proof on the candidate and Super PAC to prove that they have not communicated with each
other.239 It presumes coordination whenever the Super PAC uses a vendor that has provided
either political or fundraising strategy services to a candidate the Super PAC has supported
within the same election campaign.240 However, if the consultant implements a firewall
policy to separate staffers serving the two clients, California courts are less likely to find
that the group and candidate have coordinated.241
Minnesota goes further by also requiring that all steps leading up to a political
communication, including “fundraising, budgeting decisions, media design . . . production,
and distribution,” be independent of the candidate.242 Maine presumes coordination if a
spender and candidate use the same strategists or staff (regardless of vendor), 243 and
Vermont requires that an unlimited spending group “conduct[] its activities entirely
independent of candidates” in order to accept unlimited contributions.244
There is a groundswell of academic and political support for the presumption regime.
During the FEC’s rulemaking proceedings on the coordination rules, multiple commenters
and witnesses suggested adopting a rebuttable presumption of coordination for the use of
a common vendor. 245 Scholars also recommend that the FEC adopt a rebuttable
presumption of coordination for certain kinds of “specific activity,” arguing this is more
faithful to the “comprehensive regulation” the Supreme Court envisioned in Citizens
United.246 Former FEC commissioners also advocated for tighter coordination rules that
would consider as coordinated any spending by a Super PAC that effectively operates as
“the alter ego of a candidate.”247 The proposed Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, advocates
for this presumption as well. 248 The Freedom to Vote Act, proposed in 2021, treats as
coordinated any expenditure in which a person employs a common vendor with a candidate,
with or without a firewall.249 In addition, it eliminates the safe harbor for use of a firewall
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for a broader range of situations, including when the Super PAC or the candidate employ
former employees of the other.250
Furthermore, this proposed regime attends to the FEC’s stated and potential
objections to a presumption of coordination. It addresses the FEC’s concern that such a
presumption would have a chilling effect on speech and cause political actors to refrain
from engaging in salutary communications with the public. 251 Some lawyers argue
similarly that such a provision would be an “unconstitutional penalty on free speech”
because it would cause an “incorporated citizen group” to “forfeit its right to associate
freely with legitimate providers of professional services in order to exercise its freedom of
speech.”252 They argue that, because “a vendor at any point during an election cycle could
unilaterally decide to sell election-related services to a candidate,” such a presumption
would “thereby cancel[] the free speech rights of all of the vendor’s PAC clients regarding
that candidate.”253 However, because the presumption would be rebuttable by evidence
showing that no communication has occurred, “it does not ultimately further restrict
speech, . . . so long as the spending is truly independent and there is no coordination
between candidate and Super PAC.”254 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court recognizes, for
coordinated communications, some “marginal restriction” on speech is justified by “the
basic governmental interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process” and
would not have “any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political
associations.”255
The FEC has also shown concern with the potential for unknowing violations due to
the limited number of vendors available to political actors.256 This can be addressed by
requiring consulting firms to perform a check for possible conflicts of interest and provide
their clients with notices of potential regulatory liability. Lawyers are required to perform
a similar check when inquiring into prospective clients, and the legal industry accepts this
practice as a professional necessity in the best interests of clients.257 Similarly, the Supreme
Court imposes higher standards for due diligence upon sellers in the securities industry to
protect the economic rights of investors. 258 Considering that political media consulting
firms operate in a highly sensitive area with critical ramifications for the functioning of our
democracy, holding them to a higher standard of conduct is not unwarranted.
The FEC also cited concerns with requiring political actors to “prove a negative” by
showing that communication did not occur, but this is not prohibitive of benign campaign
behavior. Political actors and their vendors need only document their communications with
each other, including recording the identity of the vendor employee with whom the actor
spoke, the contents of their communications, the specific channels by which they conveyed
information, and where the vendor stored the information. In addition, as a witness
250
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suggested in the rulemaking hearings, the actors can also rebut the presumption by
producing evidence of an alternative source from which they obtained information
regarding the timing, targeted demographic, and messaging, including publicly available
information.259
Lastly, many objections to a presumption regime imply that the use of common
vendors is somehow essential to the typical operation of political actors.260 However, this
implication is unlikely to be true. Although objectors claim that only a limited number of
consulting firms are available to produce advertising material, two researchers estimated
that, in 2016, political actors hired as many as 297 different consulting firms in relation to
federal campaigns.261 Political actors can easily avoid the limitation of the proposed regime
simply by employing a separate vendor from the political candidates they seek to support.
The only burden this regime would impose on political actors is to perform due diligence
research on a consulting firm before engaging its services. Even if political actors
determine, for some reason, that they have no choice but to employ the services of a
particular vendor, they can still do so by meticulously documenting their communications
with the media agency. Such a requirement is not a prohibitive burden on their free speech
rights and is fully justified by Congress’s interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption.
B. A More Robust Firewall Provision
Second, the FEC should articulate a more specific and robust firewall provision in
concert with a presumption of coordination. For the presumption regime to be effective,
the FEC’s provision for a firewall must specify certain features a vendor’s firewall policy
must have to shift the presumption. This would be a more workable standard than the
outcome-based version the FEC employs. For this, the FEC can refer to its enforcement
action in the EMILY’s List case, the very one on which it relied in drafting its firewall
provision.262 For instance, the firewall provision could include a prohibition on interactions
between political consultants and federal candidates, party committees, or their agents, and
between the consultants and agents of a Super PAC regarding specified candidates.263 It
could also ban employees who interacted with certain candidates from communicating with
other employees working on that candidate’s ad purchases.264 The firewall provision could
259
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require vendors to keep campaign information obtained from political candidates in a
confidential “silo,” accessible only to employees working on the candidate’s advertising
effort. It could also require that the employees working on a candidate’s advertisement
must be located physically separately from any employees working on a Super PAC’s
advertisement and prohibited from interacting with each other in any way. This is unlikely
to be more burdensome than the screening procedure that law firms implement when hiring
new attorneys who may have an impermissible conflict of interest with a current or
potential client.265 As noted above, the critical role vendors play in our democracy justifies
the imposition of higher professional responsibilities.266 In addition, crucially, the firewall
provision or the common vendor provision must address the issue of alias entities, requiring
the same firewall requirements be implemented between entities that are functionally
identical to each other.
A potential challenge to this proposal lies in the Court’s ruling in Colorado
Republican I, in which the Court rejected the FEC’s presumption of coordination when a
political party spent in support of a candidate in its fold.267 The Court found that the mere
opportunity for coordination was insufficient to presume coordination without specific
evidence.268 Some lawyers argue that Colorado Republican I signifies that “coordination
may not be presumed on the basis of some relationship” and that the principle from this
case applies equally to the common vendor scenario.269 However, Colorado Republican I
is distinguishable. In that case, the Court noted that there was no evidence that the party
had coordinated with the candidate, and recognized that certain acts giving rise to
opportunities for corrupt bargaining would have supported a finding of coordination. With
common vendors, this Note argues that the opportunity exists.270
CONCLUSION
The enforcement regime the FEC has maintained since 2006 fails to account for the
“real world” behavior of Super PACs and the political candidates they support. 271 By
imposing such a high burden of proof to show of coordination, the FEC’s regulations leave
unaddressed activity that invites quid pro quo corruption risk. The result has been that the
rules permit an end-run around contribution limits, opening the door to increased
opportunities for candidate access to bottomless Super PAC funds. Just as Congress feared,
both complainants and the FEC have found the standards prohibitive of actionable claims.
A bright-line rule is necessary to enable more robust enforcement of secret
coordination. The FEC should reconsider adopting a rule presuming coordination
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whenever a Super PAC and a political candidate use a common vendor. By doing so, the
FEC can require candidates and their Super PACs to truly ensure and document that no
coordination takes place by performing due diligence prior to engagement and
documenting their communications with the media agency. In addition, a more detailed
firewall provision can serve to prophylactically stop actual coordination from taking place.
Because the presumption would be rebuttable by evidence showing that no
communication occurred, the FEC need not consider it to pose a significant burden on
speech liberty. So long as the spending is truly independent and there is no coordination
between a candidate and Super PAC, political actors are free to carry on campaign activities
without restraint.
Addressing the common vendor rule alone will not diminish the ever-increasing
amount of funds poured into political campaigns by wealthy donors, a concern the FEC
once shared with Congress. Yet, closing off this loophole is essential to an overall
campaign regime of full disclosure from political actors. By adopting this presumption, it
would force actors to shift their money to separate media vendors or engage only in
expenditures that are truly independent of candidates, fostering the kind of free speech
environment envisioned by the Supreme Court in Buckley. To be sure, in campaign finance,
the FEC has the unenviable task of balancing democracy against free speech. It can
safeguard both if it sets out prudent regulations reflecting behaviors in the “real world.”
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